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Abstract 
This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within 
this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net 
inflow funds by 4.79 percent per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows 
is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when 
funding liquidity, as measured by the TED spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime 
broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong 
incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are 
more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of 
funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
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1. Introduction 
 
“If you thought getting into a hedge fund was tough, try getting out of one.”  
- The Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2008 
During the recent financial crisis, the use of redemption gates by hedge fund 
managers caught many investors by surprise. Gates allow hedge funds to limit the percentage 
of fund capital that can be redeemed by investors at any point in time. Hedge funds that 
raised gates include the large and hitherto successful Citadel, Tudor Investor Corp, Fortress 
Investment Group, and D.E. Shaw.1 Fund managers argue that gates protect investors as they 
permit funds to liquidate in an orderly fashion and avoid selling assets at fire sale prices 
(Pulvino, 1998; Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). Investors contend that fund managers 
who raised gates, especially those who continue to levy management fees on gated capital, 
care more about business continuity than about investor protection. Underlying all this are 
concerns that the hedge fund industry suffers from an asset-liability mismatch.2 Investors 
worry that there may be a disparity between the liquidity that hedge funds say they can 
provide and the liquidity of their underlying assets. 
Motivated by these events, we study hedge funds that offer favorable redemption 
terms, i.e., monthly redemptions or better. These funds provide a fertile ground to search for 
instances when hedge funds over promise in terms of liquidity. We ask the following: How 
                                                            
1 See “Hedge Funds Make It Hard To Say Goodbye,” The Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2008, and “Hedge Fund 
Withdrawals Accelerate: November Demands From Investors Deepen the Worst Year on Record,” The Wall 
Street Journal, 8 December 2008.  
2 Asset-liability mismatches have other implications in finance. According to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model, the duration mismatch between banks’ illiquid long-term loans and liquid short-term deposits can 
engender self-fulfilling bank runs. Similarly, according to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), the asset-liability 
mismatch in the hedge fund industry may accelerate the demise of hedge funds that are experiencing difficulties 
and make them susceptible to predatory trading.   
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liquid are these liquid hedge funds? Do these hedge funds take on excessive liquidity risk? 
That is, are they forced to sell assets at fire sale prices in response to investor redemptions?  
If so, what drives the excessive liquidity risk-taking? To proxy for excessive liquidity risk, 
we use the impact of investor demand shocks on fund returns. In doing so, we leverage on the 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) concept of a loss spiral, a concept motivated by Shleifer 
and Vishny’s (1992) work on asset fire sales. In a loss spiral, initial losses by speculators 
precipitate investor redemptions which force speculators to sell assets at fire sale prices, 
thereby inducing further investor withdrawals. According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), this interaction between market liquidity (the ease with which assets can be traded) 
and funding liquidity (the ease with which traders can obtain financing) can explain why 
liquidity can suddenly dry up, co-moves with the market, and has commonalities across 
securities. A major channel through which this interaction can occur is via hedge funds. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this channel has become more important as several 
investment banks have scaled back or wound down their proprietary trading operations 
following the 2008 financial crisis.3  
The empirical findings are striking. We show that there exists substantial variation in 
the liquidity risk of these “liquid” hedge funds. Within this group of funds, the portfolio of 
funds with high liquidity risk exposure outperforms the portfolio of funds with low liquidity 
risk exposure by 5.80 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.26). To measure systematic liquidity 
risk exposure,4 we use fund beta with respect to the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) market-
                                                            
3 See “Bank Cutbacks Aid Hedge Funds,” Financial Times, 22 April 2009, and “Citi to Downsize Desk For 
Proprietary Trades,” Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2008.  
4 Our focus is on the concept of market liquidity as a non-diversifiable risk factor, i.e., systematic liquidity risk, 
and not on asset-specific liquidity characteristic, i.e., liquidity level. In the absence of complete fund holdings 
information, fund liquidity levels are often estimated using fund return serial correlation. Thus, by focusing on 
systematic liquidity risk, one can side-step issues such as the linear extrapolation of prices for thinly traded 
securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, and deliberate performance smoothing that plague serial 
correlation in hedge fund returns. See Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Bollen and Poole (2008). 
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wide liquidity measure (henceforth PS measure).5 The PS measure is particularly suited for 
gauging liquidity risk as it is based on temporary6 price changes accompanying order flow. 
We account for risks that are not directly related to liquidity with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
seven-factor model. We adjust the bond factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model 
appropriately for duration so that they represent returns on traded portfolios.7 After adjusting 
for co-variation with these factors, the spread is 6.11 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.58). The 
relationship between liquidity risk exposure and fund performance also manifests in cross-
sectional regressions. Controlling for other hedge fund characteristics, a one-standard 
deviation increase in liquidity risk exposure is associated with a 2.20 percent per annum (t-
statistic = 2.90) surge in annual returns. These results reinforce those of Sadka (2010) who 
shows that liquidity risk, as measured by the Sadka (2006) information-driven, permanent-
variable component of price impact, can explain the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund 
returns. Since the price impact of asset fire sales, as envisaged by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), 
is transitory and unrelated to information, we argue that the PS measure is more relevant for 
our purposes.   
The aforementioned results suggest that hedge funds that grant favorable redemption 
terms differ significantly in terms of their appetites for liquidity risk. Moreover, the rewards 
for bearing liquidity risk are high. But do these hedge funds take on excessive liquidity risk? 
                                                            
5 The PS measure is derived from the liquidity measures of individual stocks listed on the NYSE and the 
AMEX. One concern is that hedge funds do not only trade U.S. equities. However, there is mounting evidence 
that liquidity is correlated across stock and bond markets (Chordia, Sarkar, Subrahmanyam, 2005; Goyenko and 
Ukhov, 2009) and across countries (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2010). Therefore, the PS measure may reflect a 
general state of liquidity that encompasses markets other than just the NYSE and the AMEX. 
6 There are many ways to capture liquidity risk. Since our goal is to relate liquidity risk to fire sales at hedge 
funds, liquidity risk measures derived from the temporary component of price impact such as the PS measure 
are more appropriate. Other measures of liquidity risk derived from price impact, such as that proposed by 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), do not distinguish between temporary and permanent component of price changes 
accompanying order flow. Nonetheless, we show in robustness checks that the results are qualitatively similar 
when we employ the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure. 
7 In a robustness test, to cater for hedge fund exposure to equity option-based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 
2001), we also augment the model with two out-of-the-money S&P 500 option-based factors from the Agarwal 
and Naik (2004) model. These factors were generously supplied by Narayan Naik. 
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We show that liquidity risk exposure parlays into problems for hedge funds when investors 
deploy and redeem capital. On average, hedge funds that experience high inflows 
subsequently outperform hedge funds that experience low inflows by 4.79 percent per year (t-
statistic = 4.70) after accounting for co-variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) model. These results are robust to adjustments for backfill and incubation bias, fund 
fees, and thin-trading induced serial correlation in fund returns (Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov, 2004).  
Consistent with a fire sale story, liquidity risk amplifies the effects of capital flows on 
fund returns, both in the cross-section and inter-temporally. Within the fund quintile with the 
highest exposure to liquidity risk, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 4.97 percent per year. 
Conversely, within the fund quintile with the lowest exposure to liquidity risk, the spread is 
2.84 percent per year. When the markets are bereft of liquidity, i.e., when the PS measure 
falls below its 20th percentile level, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 9.13 percent per 
year. When markets are flushed with liquidity, i.e., when the PS measure rises above its 80th 
percentile level, the spread is only -1.48 percent per year. In addition, the spread is 
particularly large for months that are anecdotally associated with sharp contractions in market 
liquidity. For example, in August 1998, during the LTCM crisis, the annualized abnormal 
spread was 24.57 percent. More recently, in March 2008 with the demise of Bear Stearns and 
in September 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the annualized abnormal 
spreads were 8.57 percent and 6.37 percent, respectively.  
In line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), individual hedge fund flows are more 
impactful when economy-wide funding liquidity is tight. We show that the abnormal flow 
portfolio spread is higher when the Treasury-EuroDollar (TED) spread is wide, net repo 
volume is low, prime broker stock returns are poor, and aggregate hedge fund flows are 
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sparse.8 These results also resonate with Shleifer and Vishny (1992); when aggregate funding 
liquidity is tight, fire sales are more likely since there are few ready buyers when hedge funds 
need to sell their specialized assets (e.g., distressed debt, convertible bonds, etc). Leverage 
also heightens the impact of fund flow on returns. The flow portfolio abnormal spread for 
funds employing leverage is 1.6 times that for funds eschewing leverage. Moreover, cross-
sectional regression estimates indicate that the findings are driven more by outflows than by 
inflows.  These conditional results are more in keeping with the fire sale story than with the 
Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) smart money effect. It is hard to understand why investors 
would be more prescient for leveraged funds, for funds that embrace liquidity risk, during a 
liquidity crunch, and when redeeming capital.  
What drives excessive liquidity risk-taking? If excessive liquidity risk primarily 
benefits managers at the expense of investors, it should be related to fund agency problems. 
Hence, we ask whether the return impact of flows is stronger for funds that are prone to 
agency problems. We posit that small funds, funds with low-powered managerial incentives, 
and funds serviced by multiple prime brokers are most susceptible to agency issues. Small 
funds tend to face greater pressures to raise capital than do large funds which may well be 
grappling with capacity constraints. Moreover, according to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross 
(2003) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), incentive fees, manager option deltas9, and 
manager co-investment help align the interests of fund managers with those of their investors. 
In addition, by engaging multiple prime brokers, a fund prevents prime brokers from 
effectively monitoring counterparty risk since each prime broker is not privy to its entire 
                                                            
8 Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) employ these economy-wide funding liquidity measures to study the impact 
of adverse funding liquidity shocks on the probability of return contagion across hedge fund styles. 
9 The incentive fee contract can be viewed as a call option written by investors on the assets under management, 
where the strike price is determined by the net asset value at which different investors enter the fund, as well as 
the hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions. We follow Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and define 
manager option delta as the sensitivity of that option value to a one-percent change in asset value. 
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portfolio. In keeping with an agency explanation, we find that the flow portfolio spread is 
most pronounced for funds with few assets under management, low incentive fees, depressed 
manager option deltas, no manager capital co-invested, and multiple prime brokers.   
Overall, our results suggest that an asset-liability mismatch exists in the hedge fund 
industry. In doing so, we build on the following themes. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that 
coordinated demand shocks by mutual funds experiencing investor outflows create 
substantial price pressure in the stocks that they hold. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) 
find that, in 2005, large capital redemptions by investors in convertible arbitrage funds 
caused the prices of convertible bonds to deviate significantly from theoretical values. We 
extend their work and show that, as a result of excessive liquidity risk-taking at hedge funds, 
even uncoordinated investor demand shocks can engender fire sales at hedge funds. Bollen 
and Poole (2008, 2010) contend that hedge fund managers avoid reporting losses to attract 
and retain investors. We show that hedge funds, especially those that are susceptible to 
agency issues, tend to load up excessively on liquidity risk so as to generate impressive 
returns and draw investor capital. Aragon (2007) argues that share restrictions allow hedge 
fund managers to efficiently manage illiquid assets and those benefits are captured by 
investors in the form of a share illiquidity premium. Our analysis suggests that hedge funds 
do not always choose to use share restrictions to manage systematic liquidity risk exposure.  
This paper also adds to recent work that relates liquidity to hedge funds. Patton and 
Ramadorai (2010) find that some hedge funds condition their non-liquidity risk exposures on 
daily measures of market liquidity. Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2010) argue that hedge funds 
can successfully time their liquidity risk exposures. Aragon and Strahan (2010) demonstrate 
that the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a funding liquidity crisis that caused stocks 
traded by Lehman-connected funds to experience declines in market liquidity. Boyson, 
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Stahel, and Stulz (2010) examine the effects of funding liquidity shocks on contagion across 
hedge fund styles. As mentioned, our paper builds on seminal work by Sadka (2010) who 
shows that liquidity risk can explain the cross-section of hedge fund returns. Unlike these 
papers, we focus on excessive liquidity risk-taking by hedge funds, and how that is related to 
fire sales and agency problems. Our findings indicate that ex-post, redemption gates are 
helpful in preventing further flow-induced deterioration in hedge fund performance. 
However, ex-ante, gates may encourage hedge funds, especially those that are prone to 
agency problems, to take on more liquidity risk than they should, exacerbating the asset-
liability mismatch. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methodology used. 
Section 3 presents tests of hedge fund liquidity while Section 4 offers tests of hedge fund 
flows. Section 5 explores the relationship between agency problems and excessive liquidity 
risk. Section 6 reports results from robustness tests, including a correction for sample 
selection bias. Section 7 concludes.   
2. Data and methodology 
We evaluate the liquidity of hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee10 returns and assets 
under management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS and HFR datasets 
from January 1990 to December 2008. Since TASS and HFR started distributing their data in 
1994, the datasets do not contain information on funds that died before December 1993. This 
gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by focusing on data from January 1994 
onwards. 
 In our fund universe, we have a total of 11,701 hedge funds, of which 4,979 are live 
                                                            
10 Our results are robust to using pre-fee returns. 
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funds and 6,722 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share 
classes may cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.11 This 
leaves us with a total of 8,251 hedge funds, of which 3,237 are live funds and 5,014 are dead 
funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS and HFR. While there are 2,382 
funds that appear in both databases, there are many funds that belong to only one database. 
Specifically, there are 2,609 funds and 3,260 funds peculiar to the TASS and HFR databases, 
respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining data from more than one source. 
 Other than monthly return and size information, our sample also captures data on fund 
characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption frequency, notification 
period, investment style, fund leverage indicator, and fund minimum investment. Since 
minimum investments are sometimes quoted in currencies other than U.S. dollar, we convert 
all minimum investments to U.S. dollars using exchange rates on 31 December 2008, so as to 
facilitate meaningful comparison. We classify those funds that allow for monthly 
redemptions or better as funds granting favorable redemption terms.12 Our analysis centers on 
these 5,015 funds, which constitute roughly 60 percent of our hedge fund universe.  
 Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued 
securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take 
positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take 
advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, 
mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. 
                                                            
11 Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. 
12 Our baseline results are robust to requiring that funds also have a redemption notice period that is equal to or 
less than a month. The reason is that 86 percent of the funds that allow for redemptions on a monthly basis or 
better also have redemption notice periods that are equal to or less than a month. We note that within our sample 
of “liquid” funds, the majority, i.e., 83 percent, allow for redemptions on a monthly basis. 
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Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, 
equities, and bonds in the futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on 
spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. 
Table 1 breaks down the funds in our sample by investment strategy and reports the 
redemption frequency distribution as well as the number of live and dead funds in each 
strategy. It is clear from Table 1 that the majority of funds across most investment styles 
allow for redemptions on a monthly basis or better.  
We recognize that hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 
2000; 2009). These biases stem from the fact that, due to the lack of regulation amongst 
hedge funds, inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there is a self-
selection bias. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period where they rely on 
internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated funds with 
successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund databases while the 
unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias.  Separate from this, when a fund is 
listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, since successful 
funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these backfilled returns tend 
to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the analysis that follows, we will repeat the 
tests after dropping the first 12 months of return data from each fund so as to ensure that the 
results are robust to backfill and incubation bias.   
Throughout this paper, we model the non-liquidity related risks of hedge funds using 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors include the 
excess return on the S&P 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) 
constructed as the difference between the Wilshire small and large capitalization stock 
indices; the yield spread of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond over the 3-month Treasury bill, 
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adjusted for duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of 
Moody’s BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration 
(BAAMTSY), and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on currencies 
(PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to 
replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies [see Fung and Hsieh 
(2001)] on their respective underlying assets.13 These seven factors have been shown by Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns.  
To proxy for market liquidity, we employ the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate 
monthly innovation in liquidity measure14 [see their Eqn. (8)]. Their monthly market-wide 
liquidity measure, an average of individual stock measures estimated with daily stock data, 
relies on the principle that order flow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is lower. 
The PS measure is particularly relevant for our purposes since the price impact of asset fire 
sales, as envisaged by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), is transitory and unrelated to information. 
It is comforting to note that the liquidity measure exhibits downward spikes corresponding to 
months anecdotally associated with sharp contractions in liquidity. For example, the liquidity 
measure is particularly low in October 1997 at the height of Asian financial crisis, in 
September 1998 following the Russian Ruble default and the problems at Long-Term Capital 
Management (Lowenstein, 2000), in March 2008 when Bear Stearns collapsed, and in 
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
The PS measure is derived from the liquidity measures of individual stocks listed on 
the NYSE and the AMEX. One concern is that hedge funds do not only trade U.S. equities. 
However, there is mounting evidence that liquidity is correlated across stock and bond 
                                                            
13 David Hsieh kindly supplied these risk factors. The trend following factors can be downloaded from 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls. 
14 Lubos Pástor generously provided the data on the liquidity measure.  The liquidity measure can be 
downloaded from http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research. 
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markets (Chordia, Sarkar, Subrahmanyam, 2005; Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009) and across 
countries (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2010). Therefore, the PS measure may reflect a general 
state of liquidity that encompasses markets other than just the NYSE and the AMEX. 
3. Tests of hedge fund liquidity 
To begin, we study the liquidity risk appetites of hedge funds that grant favorable 
redemption terms to their investors. This sets the stage for the analysis of the return impact of 
capital flows that follows.  
3.1. Portfolio sorts 
 In this effort, we follow the approach used in Section III B of Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003), and construct portfolios of hedge funds based on their historical liquidity risk 
exposure.  Every January 1st, starting in 1997, we form ten hedge fund portfolios based on 
fund historical Pástor and Stambaugh liquidity beta. Fund historical liquidity beta is 
estimated in the presence of the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, using the past 
36-months of data and for funds with at least 30 months of return information. The post-
formation returns on these decile portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years 
to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of the 
decile portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The alpha of the spread 
between portfolio 1 (high liquidity beta funds) and portfolio 10 (low liquidity beta funds) 
represents the dispersion in expected returns, as a result of variation in liquidity risk exposure 
across hedge funds, that is not captured by exposures to other factors. 
 The results, reported in Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected returns, on 
the portfolios sorted by historical liquidity beta, that are unexplained by the other factors. The 
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return spread, between portfolio 1 and portfolio 10, is economically and statistically 
significant at 5.80 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.26). As in the rest of the paper, we base 
statistical inferences on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. After 
adjusting for co-variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread 
increases marginally to 6.11 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.58). These results suggest that 
there exist substantial differences in liquidity risk exposures within our sample of “liquid” 
hedge funds. As a result of the cross-sectional variation in liquidity risk exposure, hedge 
funds that load up more on liquidity risk are able to harvest a liquidity risk premium and 
outperform hedge funds that eschew liquidity risk. These results echo those of Sadka (2010) 
who measures liquidity risk using the Sadka (2006) information-driven, permanent-variable 
component of price impact. However, since the price impact of asset fire sales is transitory 
and unrelated to information, we argue that the PS measure is more relevant for our purposes. 
3.2. Cross-sectional regressions 
One disadvantage of the portfolio-based approach is that it is difficult to 
simultaneously control for fund characteristics that may also affect fund performance. For 
example, smaller hedge funds may partake in illiquid strategies. These funds may outperform 
other funds simply because they are less affected by capacity constraints and not because of 
their higher liquidity risk exposures. To distinguish from such competing explanations, we 
estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions on monthly hedge fund alpha. 
The independent variables include hedge fund historical liquidity beta as well as other hedge 
fund characteristics that may impact fund performance. Specifically, we first run cross-
sectional regressions for each month. Then, we report the time series averages of the 
coefficient estimates, and use the time-series standard errors of the average slopes to draw 
inferences. The Fama-MacBeth methodology is a convenient and conservative way of 
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accounting for potential cross-correlation in residuals. According to Fama and French (2002), 
Fama-MacBeth standard errors are often two to five times the OLS standard errors from 
pooled panel regressions that ignore cross-correlation. 
 Following Carhart (1997), we first calculate monthly fund abnormal return relative to 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. Abnormal return or alpha is calculated as fund excess 
returns minus the factor realizations times loadings estimated over the entire sample period. 
Hence, we have  
)
10(
miMmiMmiM
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where i = 1, …, nfunds, m = 1,…,M, imALPHA  is the abnormal return of fund i for month m, 
imr  is fund return in excess of the risk free rate. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, we 
only include results for funds with at least 36 months of return data. 
Next, we estimate the following Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions: 
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where LIQBETA is fund historical liquidity beta, PERFFEE is fund performance fee, 
MGTFEE is fund management fee, MININV is minimum investment amount, FUNDAGE is 
fund age in months, FUNDSIZE is fund assets under management, STYLEDUM is investment 
style dummy, and GEODUM is investment region dummy. The historical liquidity betas are 
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calculated as in the portfolio sorts. We also estimate regressions on monthly fund returns to 
ensure that our results are not artefacts of the model for performance evaluation. 
 The coefficient estimates on the historical liquidity beta reported in Table 3 
corroborate the portfolio sort results from the previous section. They reveal a strong positive 
relationship between historical liquidity beta and hedge fund performance. This relationship 
holds both in a univariate [Eq. (2)] and multivariate setting [Eq. (3)] where we control for 
various fund attributes. After adjusting for return co-variation with the other fund 
characteristics, a one-standard deviation increase in liquidity risk exposure engenders a 2.20 
percent per year (t-statistic = 2.90) increase in fund returns and a 1.64 percent per year (t-
statistic = 2.61) increase in fund alpha. The coefficient estimates on the control variables 
dovetail with prior research. Consistent with Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), returns are 
negatively correlated with fund age. Also, in the spirit of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), 
high performance fee funds outperform low performance fee funds.  
4. Tests of hedge fund flow 
The results thus far suggest that hedge funds that grant generous redemption terms 
differ significantly in their appetites for liquidity risk. It remains to show that these funds take 
on excessive liquidity risk. Theoretical work by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Shin and Morris (2004) and others, suggest that when funds take 
on excessive liquidity risk, capital shocks from investors may translate into short-term prices 
changes for the underlying assets held by the same funds. Further, given the view expressed 
by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that illiquidity amplifies the impact of asset fire 
sales,15 we should observe that such effects are stronger for funds that bear greater liquidity 
                                                            
15 See the discussion on liquidity spirals and Figure 2 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
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risk and during times of low market liquidity and tight funding liquidity. In this section, we 
explore these issues by studying the effects of fund flow on subsequent fund performance.   
4.1. Portfolio sorts 
To understand the effects of fund flows on fund performance, we adopt the portfolio-
based approach used in Section 3.1 and construct ten portfolios of hedge funds based on fund 
flows last month. The post-formation returns on these decile portfolios during the next month 
are linked across months to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate 
the performance of the decile portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The 
alpha of the spread between portfolio 1 (high flow funds) and portfolio 10 (low flow funds) 
represents the dispersion in expected returns, as a result of variation in capital flow across 
hedge funds, that is not captured by exposures to the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
model. 
The results reported in Table 4 are broadly consistent with the fire sale story. We find 
that hedge funds that experience strong inflows subsequently outperform hedge funds that 
experience strong outflows by 5.28 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.92). After adjusting for 
co-variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread decreases 
somewhat to 4.79 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.70). Figure 1 illustrates the monthly CARs 
from the high flow and low flow portfolios. It indicates that the cumulative spread has 
increased steadily over the sample period.16   
There are concerns that the flow portfolio sort results may be due to hedge fund self-
selection biases, serial correlation in hedge fund returns induced by thin trading, or the 
                                                            
16 For consistency with the sort on fund liquidity beta (Table 2), we evaluate the flow portfolio sort from 
January 1997 to December 2008. It is comforting to note that the results are just as strong for the flow portfolio 
sort with an evaluation period starting in January 1994. 
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imputation of fund fees. Funds with high net inflows may backfill or incubate their returns 
more than funds with low net inflows. Further, serial correlation in fund returns may arise 
from linear interpolation of prices for infrequently traded securities, the use of smoothed 
broker dealer quotes, or in some cases, deliberate performance smoothing behaviour. This 
coupled with return chasing behaviour by hedge fund investors may drive the results from our 
flow portfolio sort. Finally, funds with high net inflows may charge lower fees and hence 
earn higher returns on a post-fee basis. To cater for such concerns, we redo the portfolio sorts 
after adjusting for backfill and incubation bias by removing the first 12 months of return data 
for each fund, after unsmoothing fund returns using the algorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov (2004), and after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns. The results from these 
robustness tests are presented in Table 5 and indicate that the superior performance of the 
high inflow fund portfolio is not driven by backfill and incubation bias, thin trading-induced 
serial correlation, or lower fees.17     
Yet another concern is that the results in Table 4 may be a manifestation of the smart 
money effect (Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999) or the idea that investors can correctly predict the 
performance of hedge funds. According to the smart money hypothesis, prescient investors 
invest in funds that subsequently outperform and redeem from funds that subsequently 
underperform. However, if investors are truly smart, they should be able to predict fund 
performance several months or a year in advance, and not just one or two months ahead. To 
investigate, we insert a gap of two months between the formation and evaluation periods. At 
the start of every month, we sort funds into decile portfolios based on fund flow three months 
ago and hold for one month. The spread between portfolios 1 and 10 is no longer statistically 
                                                            
17 There are also concerns that hedge funds that are very small are less relevant to large institutional investors. 
Hence we redo the sorts after removing funds with assets under management less than US$20m. The sort results 
are virtually unchanged with this adjustment, suggesting that they are not driven solely by the smallest funds. 
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different from zero with the two-month gap.18 This suggests that the effects of fund flow on 
fund performance are transient (i.e., dissipating within a quarter) and are more in keeping 
with the fire sale story than with the smart money effect.19 This also indicates that our 
findings are not due to fundamental differences between the securities held by funds 
experiencing subscriptions and those held by funds facing redemptions.20 
If the flow portfolio spread is driven by the return impact of asset fire sales, then it 
should be more pronounced when market liquidity is low and for funds that take on greater 
liquidity risk. To investigate, we sort the sample months into five states based on market 
liquidity, using the PS measure as a proxy, and plot in Figure 2A the average flow portfolio 
abnormal spreads for the various states. Following the referee’s suggestion, we average the 
middle three states to minimize noise and better showcase the general trend. We find that the 
spread between the high and low flow portfolios is exceptionally high when market liquidity 
is low. Specifically, when market liquidity falls below its 20th percentile level, the average 
annualized abnormal spread is 9.13 percent. In contrast, the average annualized abnormal 
spread when market liquidity rises above its 80th percentile level is only 48.1−  percent. The 
difference in average abnormal spreads between these two states is statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  
                                                            
18 We note that when we insert a gap of one month between formation and evaluation period, the flow portfolio 
spread decreases to 3.37 percent per year but is still statistically significant at the five percent level. After 
adjusting for co-variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, it falls marginally to 3.18 
percent per year. 
19 The counter argument is that investors are smart but due to the diseconomies of scale envisaged by Berk and 
Green (2004), inflows only predict returns in the short term. We note that that the spread alpha narrows from 
4.79 to 0.93 percent per annum with the inclusion of the two-month gap between formation and evaluation 
periods. In unreported results, we show that capacity constraints can only explain 0.15 percent of this 3.86 
percent reduction in annualized spread alpha. Hence, it is unlikely that accumulated flows are responsible for the 
transience of the flow portfolio spread. These results are available upon request. 
20 Sapp and Tiwari (2004) show that, for mutual funds, the stock momentum phenomenon documented by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) can explain the smart money effect. To sidestep the stock momentum story, we 
augment our hedge fund factor model with the MOM factor culled from Kenneth French’s website and redo the 
flow portfolio sorts. The resultant spread alpha is virtually identical to that reported in Table 4 and indicates that 
the impact of fund flow on fund performance is unrelated to stock momentum.  
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Moreover, the abnormal spread is particularly large for months anecdotally associated 
with sharp contractions in market liquidity. For example, in October 1997, at the height of the 
Asian financial crisis, the abnormal spread was 24.01 percent per year. In August 1998 when 
Russia defaulted on the Ruble and triggered a massive liquidity crunch that decimated Long-
Term Capital Management (Lowenstein, 2000), the annualized abnormal spread was 24.57 
percent. More recently, in March 2008 when Bear Stearns collapsed and in September of 
2008 with the demise of Lehman Brothers, the annualized abnormal spreads were 8.57 and 
6.37, respectively. Taken together, these results dovetail with the view expressed by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that the effects of fire sales should be heightened when 
market liquidity is low. They also cast further doubt on the smart money effect since it is hard 
to understand why investors would be more prescient when markets are bereft of liquidity. 
Thus far we have shown that the impact of fire sales is linked to the intertemporal 
variation in market liquidity. Does the cross-sectional variation in fund market liquidity 
exposure also heighten the impact of fund flows on fund returns? To investigate, we sort the 
funds first into quintiles21 based on historical liquidity risk exposure and then sort again into 
quintiles based on fund flow. Panels A and B of Table 6 report the flow portfolio sort results 
for funds whose historical liquidity risk exposures lie above the 80th percentile and below the 
20th percentile, respectively. Consistent with the hypothesis that market liquidity should 
reinforce the effects of capital flow, we find that the flow portfolio spread is higher for funds 
that embrace liquidity risk than for funds that eschew liquidity risk. After accounting for co-
variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the flow portfolio spread 
within the fund quintile with the highest exposure to liquidity risk is 4.97 percent per year (t-
                                                            
21 We sort funds into quintiles during each stage of the double sort due to concerns that a ten-by-ten sort will 
result in too few funds per group to form statistical inferences. 
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statistic = 2.43). In contrast, the corresponding flow portfolio spread within the fund quintile 
with the lowest exposure to liquidity risk is only 2.84 percent per year (t-statistic = 1.35).       
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), in a corporate finance setting, asset fire 
sales are more likely when financial distress clusters by industry. Hence, in a capital markets 
setting, the effects of individual fund flows should be most pronounced when economy-wide 
funding liquidity is tight. This is because when aggregate funding liquidity is low, hedge 
funds that need to sell their specialized assets (e.g., convertible bonds, distressed debt, etc) to 
cater for investor redemptions will not be able to find ready buyers as other hedge funds are 
also facing redemptions or margin calls. Similarly, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue 
that economy-wide funding liquidity shocks, in the form of increased margins, can reinforce 
the impact of investor demand shocks.  
To investigate the impact of aggregate funding liquidity on the flow abnormal spread, 
we sort the months in our sample into five states based on the TED spread, net repo volume, 
aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns. The TED spread is the Treasury-
EuroDollar spread culled from the Federal Reserve website. Net repo volume is the 
difference between overnight repurchase and reverse repurchase volume constructed from 
weekly data supplied by Tobias Adrian of the Federal Reserve. Aggregate hedge fund flows 
are total percentage flows from the funds in our sample. Prime broker stock returns are the 
equally-weighted stock returns of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, UBS AG, 
Bank of America, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
and Bank of New York Mellon, adjusted for mergers and bankruptcy returns. A widening of 
the TED spread is typically associated with higher borrowing costs (Gupta and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000). Net repo volume is related to funding liquidity and dealer leverage 
(Adrian and Fleming, 2005). Poor performance of prime brokers may translate into higher 
20 
 
margins for their hedge funds clients as prime brokers cut down on risk. Boyson, Stahel, and 
Stulz (2010) employ these measures to show that contagion across hedge fund styles 
increases when funding liquidity is tight. We scale the TED spread and net repo volume by 
their respective past 36-month standard deviations to adjust for time varying volatility in 
these series.22 We show in Figs 2B – 2E that the flow portfolio abnormal spread rises when 
aggregate funding liquidity is tight. For example, the spread is exceptionally high when net 
repo volume, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker index returns fall below their 
respective 20th percentile levels. Also, we find that the flow abnormal spread increases 
steadily as the TED spread widens.23   
Leverage is another factor that compounds the effects of investor flow. Given the 
same dollar outflow, funds that employ leverage will have to liquidate a greater dollar 
amount of assets than funds that shun leverage. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that 
leveraged speculators are susceptible to a margin spiral if margins are increasing in market 
illiquidity. In the margin spiral, a funding shock to speculators lowers market liquidity, 
leading to higher margins, which tightens speculators’ funding constraints further, and so on. 
To explore the effects of leverage on hedge fund fire sales, we redo the flow portfolio sorts 
for leveraged funds and non-leveraged funds separately, and report the results in Panels C 
and D of Table 6. After accounting for co-variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) model, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 3.72 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.36) 
for funds employing leverage and only 2.32 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.01) for funds 
eschewing leverage. Clearly, leverage amplifies the effects of capital flows on hedge fund 
performance.  
                                                            
22 Inferences remain unchanged when we use the raw measures of the TED spread and net repo volume. 
23 In the spirit of Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010), we also condition the flow portfolio abnormal spread on the 
return of the MSCI World Commercial Bank Index. Consistent with our prior results on funding liquidity, we 
find a negative relationship between the abnormal spread and commercial bank index returns.  
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The Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure is derived from liquidity 
measures of individual stocks. Therefore, such a liquidity measure should be most relevant 
for hedge funds trading in equity markets. It would be interesting to check whether the 
conditional liquidity results (Fig 2A and Panels A and B of Table 6) apply to these funds as 
well. In that effort, we redo the conditional liquidity analyses for equity long/short and 
security selection funds. We find that the results also hold funds within these investment 
strategy groups. For example, within the security selection fund group, the average 
annualized flow portfolio abnormal spread is 11.73 percent when liquidity lies below its 20th 
percentile level and is 0.58 percent when liquidity rises above its 80th percentile level. Within 
the same group, the annualized abnormal spread is 8.76 percent for funds with liquidity risk 
greater than the 80th percentile versus 2.38 percent for funds with liquidity risk lower than the 
20th percentile.    
Since the fire sale effect is transient in nature, it is important that our portfolios 
feature short formation and evaluation horizons as well as frequent rebalancing. Nonetheless, 
one concern is that the monthly holding horizon of the baseline flow portfolio sort is not 
implementable in practice. To better gauge the economic and practical significance of the fire 
sale effect, we sort funds based on last month’s fund flow but hold for one quarter and 
rebalance every month. This implies that at any point in time, each portfolio comprises three 
sub-portfolios: the first formed based on fund flow one month ago, the second formed based 
on fund flow two months ago, and the third formed based on fund flow three months ago. 
Given the longer average time lag between the formation and evaluation periods, it is not 
surprising that the flow portfolio spread alpha diminishes to 2.76 percent per annum. 
Nonetheless, it is comforting to note that the spread alpha is still statistically significant at the 
one percent level. It is also reassuring to note that the alpha of the top flow decile remains 
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economically and statistically significant at 4.98 percent per annum (t-statistic = 4.23) with 
this adjustment. 
4.2. Cross-sectional regressions 
To ascertain that our flow portfolio results are not driven by other hedge fund 
characteristics, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions on hedge 
fund performance. The cross-sectional regressions also allow us to control for the explanatory 
power of past fund performance on flows and separately measure the effects of inflows and 
outflows on fund returns. In the absence of a cash buffer, hedge funds that grant favorable 
redemption terms have to quickly liquidate in response to outflows. Conversely, funds 
experiencing inflows do not have to immediately increase their positions as the new capital 
may be kept as cash in the interim. This suggests that one should observe a stronger return 
effect with outflows than with inflows. 
To investigate, we re-estimate the Eq. (2) and (3) regressions with two additional 
independent variables: FLOW_POS and FLOW_NEG. The variable FLOW_POS equals last 
month’s fund flow when flow is positive and equals zero otherwise, while FLOW_NEG 
equals last month’s fund flow when flow is negative and equals zero otherwise. The 
coefficient estimates on FLOW_POS and FLOW_NEG capture the return effects of fund 
inflow and outflow, respectively. We also include as a control, last month’s fund return or 
fund alpha24 to account for the explanatory power of fund performance on flow. Finally, for 
completeness, we also estimate regressions with last month’s fund flow in place of 
FLOW_POS and FLOW_NEG.  
                                                            
24 Our results are robust to including fund return or fund alpha lagged two months as a control as well. 
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The coefficient estimates reported in Table 7 indicate that consistent with our a priori 
intuition, fund outflows exert a stronger impact on subsequent returns than do fund inflows. 
This conclusion holds whether we control for other fund characteristics or not. After 
adjusting for return co-variation with the other fund characteristics, a one standard deviation 
increase in fund outflow decreases fund returns by 2.05 percent per year. The coefficient 
estimates on FLOW_NEG are statistically significant at the one percent level across all 
regression specifications. By comparison, the coefficient estimates on FLOW_POS are about 
half the magnitude of those on FLOW_NEG and are statistically indistinguishable from zero 
at the five percent level, at least for the regression on monthly alpha with controls. As in 
Section 4.1, we also perform robustness tests with fund alpha adjusted for backfill and 
incubation bias, with alpha derived from unsmoothed returns, and with pre-fee alpha. The 
results are again broadly supportive of the view that the effects of fund flow on returns are 
driven more by redemptions than by subscriptions.   
One way to further distinguish from the smart money story is to explore cross-fund 
effects in a regression setting. For fund x, do inflows into other funds operating similar 
strategies also affect the returns of fund x? To investigate, for each fund, we identify other 
similar funds based on pair-wise return correlations over the past 36-months. Specifically, 
given fund x and a group size of N, the group is the N other funds whose returns are most 
correlated with those of fund x. We experiment with groups of 30, 50, and 80 funds. Next, we 
define the group flow variable as the equal-weighted flow of the funds in the same group, and 
augment the independent variables in the Table 7 regressions on monthly alpha with group 
flow. The coefficient estimates on group flow are positive and statistically significant at the 
five percent level for all regression specifications and group sizes, suggesting that our 
findings are not driven by the smart money effect.  
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5. Agency and the asset-liability mismatch 
 What drives excessive liquidity risk-taking amongst hedge funds? If excessive 
liquidity risk primarily benefits hedge fund managers, via capital accumulation and fee 
generation, at the expense of investors, it must be related to principal agent problems at the 
fund level. Therefore, we hypothesize that the return impact of fund flows is amplified for (i) 
funds that have strong incentives to raise capital, (ii) funds whose managers’ interests are less 
aligned with those of their investors, and (iii) funds that are serviced by multiple prime 
brokers. The last point follows from the view that to manage counterparty risk, prime brokers 
are incentivized to monitor the risk-taking activities of their hedge fund clients. When a fund 
employs more than one prime broker, it becomes much harder for each prime broker to 
independently monitor the fund since the prime broker cannot see the fund’s entire portfolio.  
 To test whether fund incentives to raise capital shape excessive liquidity risk-taking, 
we perform double sorts on fund assets under management and net inflows last month. Small 
funds typically need to raise enough capital to attain critical mass. Conversely, large funds 
often grapple with diseconomies of scale and may not benefit as much from additional capital 
infusions. Indeed, Goeztmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) show that large funds are less 
willing to take in new money than small funds. It seems reasonable to posit that small funds 
face greater pressures to raise capital than do large funds. Panels A and B of Table 8 report 
results from one such double sort on size and fund flow. We find that the flow portfolio 
spread is somewhat higher for funds with below median assets under management than for 
funds with above median assets under management. We observe sharper differences for funds 
at the extreme ends of the size spectrum. As shown in Panels C and D of Table 8, the flow 
portfolio spread for funds with assets under management below the 20th percentile is 2.3 
times that for funds with assets under management above the 80th percentile. These results are 
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consistent with the view that funds with strong incentives to raise capital take on excessive 
liquidity risk so as to boost returns and attract investors.     
 Next, we test whether funds whose managers’ interests are less aligned with those of 
their investors are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. According to Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), performance fees help minimize principal agent problems by 
matching managers’ interests with those of their investors. Therefore, we sort funds into high 
and low performance fee groups and redo the flow portfolio sort within these fund groups. 
While the vast majority of funds in our sample charge a performance fee of 20 percent per 
annum, roughly 21 percent of funds charge performance fees below the median while 6.8 
percent of funds levy performance fees above the median. In Panels A and B of Table 9, we 
show that the flow portfolio spread is particularly large for funds with performance fees 
below 20 percent per annum consistent with the intuition that for these funds, the interests of 
managers and investors are least aligned.25 
 Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that the performance fee does not fully 
capture managerial incentives, as two different managers that charge the same performance 
fee could be facing different dollar incentives depending on the timing and magnitude of 
investor’s capital flows and fund’s return history. They recognize, as in Goetzmann, Ingersoll 
and Ross (2003), that the performance fee contract is a call option written by the investors on 
the assets under management, where the strike price is determined by the net asset values at 
which different investors enter the fund, as well as by the hurdle rate and high-water mark 
provisions. Hence, we redo the analysis using manager option delta as defined in Appendix A 
of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).  Manager option delta is calculated using the formula 
                                                            
25 One can also argue that funds with a greater percentage management fee should have a stronger incentive to 
raise capital. Consistent with this intuition, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is higher (3.23 versus 2.10 
percent per annum) for funds with management fees greater than the median than for funds with management 
fees lower than the median. The median management fee in our fund sample is 1.5 percent per annum.  
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of Black and Scholes (1973) for valuing European call options, and is simply the sensitivity 
of the option value to a one-percent change in asset value. The results are reported in Panels 
C and D of Table 9. Consistent with the idea that manager option delta better captures 
managerial incentives, we find that the difference in flow portfolio spread between less 
aligned and more aligned funds widens when we use manager option delta to measure 
alignment. Specifically, the annualized risk-adjusted flow portfolio spread for funds with low 
manager option deltas is 5.07 percent greater than that for funds with high manager option 
deltas. Conversely, the annualized risk-adjusted flow portfolio spread for funds with low 
performance fees is only 1.49 percent greater than that for funds with high performance fees. 
In our analysis, we focus on manager option delta as opposed to the total delta of Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik (2009) as the former can be calculated without having to make assumptions 
on how managers re-invest their incentive fees. The results weaken but remain qualitatively 
similar when we use total delta instead of manager option delta. The annualized risk-adjusted 
flow portfolio spread for funds with low total deltas is 3.21 percent greater than that for funds 
with high total deltas.   
 Another way to gauge alignment of interests is to examine manager co-investment. 
Relative to managers who do not co-invest, managers who invest personal capital in their 
funds are more likely to act in the best interests of their investors. The TASS database 
includes an indicator variable for manager co-investment. Within the TASS sample, we find 
that the flow portfolio spread is attenuated when managers co-invest personal capital in their 
fund. As reported in Panels A and B of Table 10, for such funds, the risk-adjusted flow 
portfolio spread is only 2.22 percent per year. In contrast, for funds without manager co-
investment, the corresponding spread is 3.47 percent per year and is statistically significant at 
the one percent level. 
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 Lastly, we explore the relationship between excessive liquidity risk-taking and the 
number of prime brokers employed by a fund. Consistent with our intuition, we find that 
flows impact returns more for funds serviced by multiple prime brokers than for funds 
serviced by a single prime broker. As reported in Panels C and D of Table 10, the risk-
adjusted flow portfolio spread is 6.31 percent per annum for funds with multiple brokers and 
only 3.06 percent per annum for funds with single brokers. One concern is that funds with 
multiple brokers may be able to obtain better financing. Therefore, higher leverage may drive 
the larger return spread we observe within the multiple-broker fund group. However, when 
we conduct a triple sort on leverage, number of prime brokers, and fund flow, we find that 
even within the subset of funds that do not employ leverage, multiple prime broker funds are 
still more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk than single prime broker funds. 
Specifically, the risk-adjusted flow portfolio spread for the former group of funds is 5.52 
times that for the latter group of funds. This indicates that the prime broker double sort results 
are not driven by leverage.    
 Collectively, the results in this section suggest that agency problems at hedge funds 
are linked to excessive liquidity risk-taking. Fund managers who have greater incentives to 
raise capital, whose incentives are less aligned with those of their investors, and who engage 
multiple prime brokers are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. This, in turn, 
translates into a larger return impact when investors redeem or deploy capital. These results 
also suggest that since our return impact measure is closely linked to fund agency problems, 
it is indeed capturing liquidity risk-taking that is excessive from the point of view of the 
investor. 
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6. Robustness and sample selection 
In this section, we present a series of tests to ascertain the robustness of our results. 
6.1. The firm effect 
The Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, while accounting for correlations between 
observations on different funds in the same month, does not account for the firm effect or the 
correlation between observations of the same fund across different months. According to 
Petersen (2009), in the presence of the firm effect, standard errors clustered by firm (Rogers, 
1993) are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals. The firm effect may be 
present in hedge fund data given that hedge fund returns are often serially correlated. To 
address this issue, we estimate the pooled OLS versions of the regressions in Table 7 with 
White (1980) standard errors clustered by fund. The results are reported in columns 1 and 4 
of Table 11, and are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7.   
6.2. Sample selection 
Another critique of the cross-sectional regression analysis in Tables 3 and 7 is that 
fund redemption terms may not be exogenous. Funds may choose to offer favorable 
redemption terms to better compete for capital from investors. Therefore, fund redemption 
terms may be linked to variables known at inception that are related to fund propensity and 
ability to raise capital. The coefficients in Tables 3 and 7 that supposedly explain the 
variation in hedge fund performance may be contaminated by correlation between the 
residuals in these cross-sectional regressions, and the unobserved factors that shape fund 
redemption terms. To ameliorate these issues, we follow Ramadorai (2010) and employ 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure to correct for possible sample selection bias. To 
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apply the procedure, we first estimate a probit regression on the entire universe of hedge 
funds to determine the factors underlying selection. The inverse Mills ratio is then computed 
from this first stage probit and incorporated into the regression on hedge fund performance so 
as to correct for selection bias.  
To implement the Heckman correction, a critical identifying assumption is that there 
are some variables that explain selection, but not hedge fund performance. If there is no such 
“exclusion restriction,” the model is identified by only distributional assumptions about the 
residuals, which could lead to problems in estimating the parameters of the model.  The 
exclusion restriction that we employ is fund inception family size. Funds started by large 
fund families may find it easier to offer favorable redemption terms as they have access to a 
larger pool of investor capital and, having cultivated relationships with choice prime brokers, 
can take advantage of lower borrowing costs. At the same time, it is unlikely that family size 
at inception significantly affects fund performance several months post inception. As 
mentioned, other variables that determine selection may include management fee and 
performance fee. Funds with high management fees and low performance fees have strong 
incentives to raise capital and may therefore offer more attractive redemption terms to lure 
investors.    
The results from the Heckman correction are reported in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 of 
Table 11. The coefficient estimates from the selection equation (columns 2 and 5) confirm 
our intuition that funds with strong incentives to raise capital and that can tap into large 
capital pools choose to offer favorable redemption terms. The coefficient estimates on 
management fee and fund inception family size are positive while that on performance fee is 
negative. All the coefficients in the selection equation are statistically different from zero at 
the one percent level. In the Heckman model, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio takes 
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the sign of the correlation between the residuals in the regression that explain selection and 
hedge fund performance. In both the regressions on monthly returns and monthly alphas, the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. This suggests 
that hedge funds that offer favorable redemption terms are more likely to exhibit high 
unexplained returns and alphas. One view is that, controlling for fund fees and family size, 
high ability fund managers are more likely to grant favorable redemption terms as they 
believe that investors are unlikely to redeem capital given their superior investment skills. 
Regardless of whether this explanation holds true, we find that the coefficient estimates on 
the liquidity beta and flow measures with the correction for sample selection (columns 3 and 
6) are virtually identical to those from the pooled OLS regressions (columns 1 and 4). 
Moreover, the estimates on the liquidity beta and FLOW_NEG variables are statistically 
different from zero at the five percent level with the Heckman correction, indicating that the 
prior cross-sectional regression results are not tainted by sample selection issues.   
6.3. An alternative measure of liquidity risk 
There are several ways to measure liquidity risk (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006). We argue that liquidity risk measures derived 
from the temporary component of price impact, such as the PS measure, are most helpful for 
exploring the price impact of investor capital flows on hedge fund returns. Nonetheless it is 
important to show that our findings are not unique to the liquidity risk measure that we chose.  
In that effort, we replicate the liquidity beta and investor flow sort analyses using the 
illiquidity26 measure of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) (see their Eq. 22). Note that their 
measure, which is derived from that proposed by Amihud (2002), does not differentiate 
                                                            
26 Therefore, we expect the results to be reversed for the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) measure since it 
evaluates illiquidity, unlike the PS measure which assesses liquidity. 
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between the temporary and permanent components of price impact. We find that our results 
are qualitatively similar with their measure. Funds whose returns co-vary most with the 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure underperform funds whose returns co-vary 
least with the same measure. The top illiquidity beta-fund decile underperforms the bottom 
illiquidity beta-fund decile by 5.39 percent per year (t-statistic = 2.20) after adjusting for co-
variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. Also, as illustrated in Fig 2F, the impact of 
fund flows on subsequent fund returns is amplified when illiquidity is high. When the 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity measure rises above its 80th percentile level, the 
annualized flow portfolio abnormal spread is 6.85 percent (t-statistic = 2.31). Conversely, 
when the illiquidity measure falls below its 20th percentile level, the annualized flow portfolio 
abnormal spread is only 0.72 percent. Finally, capital flows are more impactful for funds that 
load negatively on the illiquidity measure. Within the quintile of funds with the lowest 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity beta, the flow portfolio abnormal spread is 6.81 
percent per annum (t-statistic = 3.09). In contrast, within the quintile of funds with the 
highest Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity beta, the spread is only 2.25 percent per 
annum.  
6.4. Dynamic risk exposures 
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios may not stay constant over 
time. As a result, the risk-adjustment for say Tables 2 and 4 may not be accurate. To account 
for dynamic factor loadings, we impose structural breaks for October 1998 (LTCM crisis) 
and April 2000 (the height of the Technology bubble), as in Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and 
Ramadorai (2008), and redo the Table 2 and 4 analyses. Even with the structural break 
adjustment, the baseline flow portfolio abnormal spread remains economically and 
statistically significant at 4.21 percent per annum (t-statistic = 4.40). The abnormal spread 
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from the sort on liquidity betas also remains relatively unchanged at 5.89 percent per annum 
(t-statistic = 2.84).  
Another way to account for dynamic risk exposures is to calculate the factor loadings 
using a rolling window approach and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns 
one month forward. When we do that using a 24-month window, we find that the baseline 
flow portfolio abnormal spread remains virtually unchanged at 4.66 percent per annum (t-
statistic = 4.24). However, the statistical significance of the liquidity beta abnormal spread is 
somewhat more sensitive to the beta estimation technology. With the rolling window 
approach, the liquidity beta abnormal spread falls to 5.55 percent per annum (t-statistic = 
1.95). We believe that the reduction in statistical significance stems from the lower degrees of 
freedom and noisier beta estimates associated with the rolling window methodology. 
Consistent with that explanation, when we group funds into quintiles and redo the rolling 
window liquidity beta sort, we find that the abnormal spread is statistically significant at the 
five percent level.  
6.5. Additional risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors may cloud the portfolio sort analysis. Relative 
to low inflow funds, high inflow funds may be loading up more on some risk-factor, say, 
emerging markets which has done well over the sample period. This could explain why there 
is a return spread between high inflow and low inflow funds. Hence, we augment the Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) model with an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging 
Markets Index return and redo the sorts for Tables 4 and 2. We find that the flow and 
liquidity beta portfolio spread alphas easily survive the inclusion of the emerging markets 
factor. After accounting for exposure to the emerging markets factor, the aforementioned 
spread alphas are 5.03 percent per annum (t-statistic = 5.05) and 5.88 percent per annum (t-
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statistic = 2.68), respectively. To cater for hedge fund exposure to option based strategies 
(Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), we also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with out-of-
the-money S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) 
model. Again, the portfolio spread alphas are robust to the  inclusion of these two additional 
risk factors.    
6.6.  Fund termination 
There are concerns that since funds that drop out from our database may have 
terminated their operations, the portfolio alphas may be biased upwards. This is because 
when a fund in the portfolio drops out of the database, we take the equal-weighted average 
return of the funds in the portfolio that remain in the database. To allay concerns regarding 
hedge fund termination, we assume that for the month after a fund drops out of the database, 
its return is -10 percent.27 Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the 
portfolio. With that adjustment, the alphas of the top and bottom flow deciles in Table 4 fall 
to 5.31 and -0.98 percent per annum, respectively. However, the flow portfolio spread alpha 
remains significant at 6.29 percent per annum (t-statistic = 6.19). Similarly, the alphas of the 
top and bottom liquidity beta deciles in Table 2 decline to 7.13 and 1.10 percent per annum, 
respectively. Still, the liquidity beta portfolio spread alpha remains significant at 6.03 percent 
per annum (t-statistic = 2.52). This suggests that our baseline results are robust to the self-
reporting and delisting biases inherent in hedge fund data. 
6.7.  Fund liquidity 
In this paper, we define liquid funds as those that allow for redemptions on a monthly 
basis or better. However, there are other ways to measure the liquidity of hedge funds vis-à-
                                                            
27 We thank the referee for suggesting this termination return. 
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vis their investors. We find that our results are also robust to using redemption notice period 
as a proxy for fund liquidity. Within the group of hedge funds with redemption notice periods 
less than or equal to a month, high inflow funds outperform low inflow funds and high 
liquidity beta funds outperform low liquidity beta funds. The annualized flow (Table 4) and 
liquidity beta (Table 2) portfolio spread alphas are 4.85 percent (t-statistic = 4.73) and 5.51 
percent (t-statistic = 2.51), respectively. 
7. Conclusion 
In a world where assets and liabilities are perfectly matched, hedge fund share 
restrictions permit funds to liquidate in an orderly fashion and avoid fire sales. Redemption 
gates are redundant. This paper challenges this view. We show that, given their redemption 
terms, hedge funds often take on greater liquidity risk exposure than they should. They do so 
as the rewards to bearing liquidity risks are substantial. Within the group of funds that offer 
favorable redemption terms to their investors, those that embrace liquidity risk harvest 
substantially higher returns than those that shun liquidity risk. As a consequence of the asset-
liability mismatch, for this same group of funds, capital shocks by investors result in 
significant but transient changes to hedge fund returns. Funds that experience high net 
inflows subsequently outperform funds that experience low net inflows by 4.79 percent per 
year after adjusting for risk. Consistent with a fire sale story, the impact of fund flows is more 
pronounced for funds that take on greater liquidity risk, for funds that employ leverage, when 
market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity is tight. Moreover, excessive liquidity 
risk-taking appears to be prevalent amongst funds that are most susceptible to agency 
problems, suggesting that such behaviour benefits fund managers at the expense of investors. 
Therefore, ex-post, given the liquidity risk exposures of hedge funds, redemption gates are 
helpful as they allow hedge funds to avoid the deleterious effects of asset fire sales. However, 
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ex-ante, the option to raise gates may ironically encourage hedge funds to take on greater 
liquidity risk, and in so doing, exacerbate the asset-liability mismatch.    
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal return of high flow versus low flow funds. Portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds every month based on fund flow
last month. Portfolio 1 is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the highest flow decile. Portfolio 10 is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds in the lowest flow
decile. Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model.  Factor loadings are estimated over the entire evaluation period. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
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Figure 2: Abnormal flow portfolio spread grouped by market liquidity and funding liquidity. Decile portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds every month
based on fund flow last month. The spread return is the return difference between the decile portfolio with the highest flow and the decile portfolio with the lowest flow. The
abnormal spread return is the difference between the spread return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
Factor loadings are estimated over the entire evaluation period. Next, the evaluation period is divided into five states (Q1 to Q5) based on the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
market-wide liquidity measure, the TED spread, net repo volume, aggregate hedge fund flows, prime broker index return, or the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) illiquidity
measure. The average abnormal spreads for the various states are graphed. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
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Investment strategy Total funds Dead funds rfreq ≤ 1 mth 1 mth < rfreq ≤ 3 mths 3 mths < rfreq ≤ 6 mths 6 mths < rfreq Return months
Security Selection 3,967 2,286 2,164 1,475 142 186 240,080
Directional Trader 1,617 1,002 1,406 192 12 7 101,569
Relative Value 1,447 972 860 526 34 27 81,756
Multi-process 1,140 682 522 472 33 113 70,365
Others 80 72 63 11 6 0 3,203
Total 8,251 5,014 5,015 2,676 227 333 496,973
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2008. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. Security Selection funds take long and short positions
in undervalued and overvalued securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ
multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations,
recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures and cash market.
Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. The total number of funds is 8,251. The total
number of dead funds is 5,014. And the total number of fund months with return information is 496,973.
Redemption frequency (rfreq)
Portfolio
Excess 
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Adj. R2
Portfolio 1 (high liquidity beta) 9.29 3.47 8.47 3.62 0.27 0.24 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.23
Portfolio 2 6.23 3.22 4.99 3.26 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.38
Portfolio 3 2.81 1.70 1.72 1.54 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.50
Portfolio 4 3.47 2.23 2.36 1.98 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.45
Portfolio 5 2.31 1.65 1.44 1.45 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.49
Portfolio 6 2.70 1.99 2.12 2.18 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.51
Portfolio 7 3.48 2.38 2.73 2.42 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.43
Portfolio 8 2.94 1.75 2.10 1.72 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.47
Portfolio 9 2.84 1.27 2.08 1.31 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.49
Portfolio 10 (low liquidity beta) 3.50 1.22 2.36 1.18 0.35 0.28 0.05 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.48
Spread (1-10) 5.80 2.26 6.11 2.58 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.31 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.11
Table 2
Sorts on liquidity beta
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every January 1st into deciles based on their beta with respect to the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
aggregate liquidity measure, estimated over the past 36 months. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh
(2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S.
10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately
adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following
strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008.
Independent
variables
no controls with controls no controls with controls
liquidity beta 0.0194** 0.0144** 0.0119** 0.0107**
(3.09) (2.90) (2.64) (2.61)
management fee 0.1012* 0.0887*
(2.09) (2.34)
performance fee 0.0086* 0.0081*
(2.09) (2.47)
min investment 0.0039 0.0016
(0.77) (0.36)
fund age in mths -0.0029* -0.0038**
(-1.99) (-2.85)
log (fund size) 0.0036 0.0122
(0.19) (0.73)
style dummies N Y N Y
region dummies N Y N Y
Table 3
Cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund performance
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable
is hedge fund monthly return or alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. In
the regressions without controls, the independent variable is the beta on the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate
liquidity measure estimated over the past 36 months. In the regressions with controls, we also include as independent
variables fund management fee, performance fee, minimum investment, fund age in months, the log of fund size, as well
as investment style and geographical region dummies. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in
parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the dummy variables are omitted for brevity. The evaluation period is from
January 1997 to December 2008. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
monthly return monthly alpha
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.43 4.23 6.21 4.90 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.48
Portfolio 2 6.42 3.51 5.45 3.87 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41
Portfolio 3 4.83 2.97 3.91 3.40 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48
Portfolio 4 3.98 2.46 2.90 2.65 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.52
Portfolio 5 4.04 2.48 3.26 2.85 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Portfolio 6 4.55 2.94 3.77 3.24 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.45
Portfolio 7 3.52 2.35 2.82 2.75 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.51
Portfolio 8 3.62 2.29 2.89 2.55 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Portfolio 9 4.51 2.55 3.68 3.21 0.24 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.56
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 2.15 1.13 1.42 1.09 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51
Spread (1-10) 5.28 4.92 4.79 4.70 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.08
Table 4
Sorts on fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted into deciles every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to
December 2008.
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 6.27 3.55 5.21 4.17 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.49
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 1.17 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48
Spread (1-10) 5.43 4.79 5.96 4.30 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.18 3.72 5.76 4.22 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.50
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 1.29 0.62 0.45 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Spread (1-10) 5.88 5.08 6.67 4.98 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.11
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 12.01 6.71 10.83 8.27 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 6.15 3.19 5.46 4.16 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51
Spread (1-10) 5.86 5.35 6.53 5.19 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.10
Panel C: Adjusted for fund fees
Table 5
Sorts on fund flow, robustness tests
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted into deciles every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of
Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities
PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January
1997 to December 2008. Panel A reports results after removing the first 12 months of returns for each fund to adjust for backfill and incubation bias. Panel B reports results
after unsmoothing returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel C reports results after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns.
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill and incubation bias
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
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t -stat of 
alpha
 
S
N
P
M
R
F
 
S
C
M
L
C
 
 
 
 
B
D
1
0
R
E
T
 
 
B
A
A
M
T
S
Y
 
 
P
T
F
S
B
D
 
 
 
P
T
F
S
F
X
 
 
 
P
T
F
S
C
O
M
 
Adj. R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 10.92 4.09 9.52 4.33 0.34 0.27 0.14 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.34
Quintile 5 (low flow) 5.52 2.11 4.55 2.16 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.30
Spread (1-5) 5.39 2.62 4.97 2.43 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 3.70 1.31 2.19 0.95 0.30 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.35
Quintile 5 (low flow) -0.12 -0.05 -0.64 -0.31 0.29 0.21 -0.04 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.39
Spread (1-5) 3.83 1.82 2.84 1.35 0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.72 4.32 6.53 4.75 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.41
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.68 2.09 2.82 2.34 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1-5) 4.04 4.73 3.72 4.36 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05
Quintile 1 (high flow) 5.46 3.03 4.56 3.69 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.54
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.79 1.32 2.24 1.62 0.28 0.18 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.57
Spread (1-5) 2.66 2.26 2.32 2.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09
Panel D: Funds not employing leverage
Table 6
Double sorts on liquidity risk exposure and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change
in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over
10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where
PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. In
Panels A and B, funds are sorted first into quintiles based on fund liquidity risk exposure and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first
based on whether they employ leverage and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Funds with high liquidity risk exposure (liquidity beta > 80th percentile)
Panel B: Funds with low liquidity risk exposure (liquidity beta < 20th percentile)
Panel C: Funds employing leverage
Independent
variables
liquidity beta 0.0176** 0.0175** 0.0132** 0.0132** 0.0120** 0.0119** 0.0104** 0.0104**
(3.34) (3.32) (2.98) (2.97) (2.83) (2.81) (2.70) (2.70)
fund return last month 0.1352** 0.1354** 0.1202** 0.1204**
(6.10) (6.12) (6.14) (6.16)
fund alpha last month 0.1143** 0.1145** 0.1063** 0.1067**
(6.96) (6.99) (7.01) (7.05)
fund flow last month 0.7750** 0.6471** 0.6878** 0.5525**
(4.04) (3.76) (4.00) (3.44)
FLOW_POS 0.6434* 0.5703* 0.6391* 0.4723
(2.01) (2.32) (2.24) (1.93)
FLOW_NEG 1.4522** 1.3230** 1.2793** 1.1735**
(2.84) (2.87) (2.99) (2.75)
fund characteristics N N Y Y N N Y Y
style dummies N N Y Y N N Y Y
region dummies N N Y Y N N Y Y
no controls with controls no controls with controls
Table 7
Cross-sectional regressions on hedge fund performance with fund flow
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return or alpha. Alpha is
estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. In the regressions without controls, the independent variables include the beta on the Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) aggregate liquidity measure estimated over the past 36 months, past fund performance, and measures of fund flow. The variable FLOW_POS is fund flow last month when
flow is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. The variable FLOW_NEG is fund flow last month when flow is negative and is equal to zero otherwise. In the regressions with
controls we also include as independent variables fund management fee, performance fee, minimum investment, fund age in months, the log of fund size, as well as investment
style and geographical region dummies. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The coefficient estimates on the fund characteristics and
dummy variables are omitted for brevity. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
monthly alphamonthly return
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha (pct/ 
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t -stat of 
alpha
 
S
N
P
M
R
F
 
S
C
M
L
C
 
 
 
 
B
D
1
0
R
E
T
 
 
B
A
A
M
T
S
Y
 
 
P
T
F
S
B
D
 
 
 
P
T
F
S
F
X
 
 
 
P
T
F
S
C
O
M
 
Adj. R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 8.33 4.49 7.11 5.53 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.51
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.39 2.31 3.63 2.97 0.25 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.56
Spread (1-5) 3.93 4.21 3.48 3.80 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Quintile 1 (high flow) 5.58 3.28 4.58 3.50 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.40
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.36 1.33 1.61 1.31 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1-5) 3.21 3.58 2.97 3.36 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06
Quintile 1 (high flow) 9.60 4.71 8.24 6.12 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.53
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.81 2.38 4.08 2.98 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.50
Spread (1-5) 4.79 3.17 4.16 2.79 0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 4.85 2.88 3.74 2.90 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.38
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.39 1.32 1.91 1.50 0.24 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.53
Spread (1-5) 2.45 2.20 1.82 1.67 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11
Panel D: Very large funds (assets under management > 80th percentile)
Table 8
Double sorts on assets under management and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change 
in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over
10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where
PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. In
Panels A and B, funds are sorted first into two groups based on fund assets under management and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted
first into quintiles based on assets under management and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Small funds (assets under management < 50th percentile)
Panel B: Large funds (assets under management > 50th percentile)
Panel C: Very small funds (assets under management < 20th percentile)
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 4.90 2.11 3.80 2.65 0.35 0.20 0.12 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.63
Quintile 5 (low flow) 1.70 0.74 0.81 0.53 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55
Spread (1-5) 3.21 2.72 2.99 2.48 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.94 3.55 6.51 2.97 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08
Quintile 5 (low flow) 6.42 2.54 5.01 2.11 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14
Spread (1-5) 1.52 0.68 1.50 0.66 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.36 3.68 7.03 4.35 0.25 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.35
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.21 0.99 1.71 0.97 0.25 0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.35
Spread (1-5) 5.14 2.88 5.32 2.81 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Quintile 1 (high flow) 2.13 0.80 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.34
Quintile 5 (low flow) 1.32 0.45 -0.13 -0.06 0.26 0.33 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.39
Spread (1-5) 0.81 0.53 0.25 0.17 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
Panel D: Funds with high manager option deltas (option delta > 80th percentile)
Table 9
Double sorts on fund managerial incentives and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in
the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-
year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is
primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. In Panels A
and B, funds are sorted first based on fund performance fee and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D, funds are sorted first into quintiles based on manager
option delta and then into quintiles based on fund flow. Manager option deltas are computed as in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).
Panel A: Funds with low performance fees (performance fee < 20 percent)
Panel B: Funds with high performance fees (performance fee > 20 percent)
Panel C: Funds with low manager option deltas (option delta < 20th percentile)
Portfolio
Excess Ret. 
(pct/ year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha (pct/ 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
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Adj. R2
Quintile 1 (high flow) 6.80 3.79 5.70 4.23 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.46
Quintile 5 (low flow) 4.15 2.26 3.49 2.94 0.23 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55
Spread (1-5) 2.64 2.61 2.22 2.12 -0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05
Quintile 1 (high flow) 6.86 3.70 5.74 4.16 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.42
Quintile 5 (low flow) 2.93 1.66 2.27 1.94 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.52
Spread (1-5) 3.93 4.20 3.47 3.85 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
Quintile 1 (high flow) 7.26 3.99 6.04 4.62 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.62 2.07 2.98 2.60 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.57
Spread (1-5) 3.64 4.06 3.06 3.69 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Quintile 1 (high flow) 8.96 4.53 8.29 4.43 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14
Quintile 5 (low flow) 3.54 1.28 1.97 0.77 0.18 0.09 0.32 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.20
Spread (1-5) 5.42 2.34 6.31 2.71 -0.12 0.01 -0.29 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07
Panel D: Funds serviced by multiple prime brokers
Table 10
Double sorts on manager capital/number of prime brokers and fund flow
Hedge funds with monthly redemption terms (or better) are sorted every month based on their fund flow last month. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of
Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The evaluation period is from January 1997
to December 2008. In Panels A and B, funds are sorted first based on whether they invest manager capital and then into quintiles based on fund flow. In Panels C and D,
funds are sorted first based on whether they are serviced by a single prime broker or by multiple prime brokers and then into quintiles based on fund flow.
Panel A: Funds with manager capital
Panel B: Funds without manager capital
Panel C: Funds serviced by a single prime broker
Independent OLS regression OLS regression
variables selection eqn regression eqn selection eqn regression eqn
liquidity beta 0.0164** 0.0165** 0.0077** 0.0079**
(6.72) [10.58] (3.67) [6.08]
fund return last month 0.1477** 0.1476**
(18.41) [36.49]
fund alpha last month 0.1011** 0.1008**
(12.59) [24.81]
FLOW_POS 0.1382 0.1410 0.1810 0.1844
(0.86) [0.83] (1.27) [1.31]
FLOW_NEG 1.075** 1.0406** 0.6358* 0.5919*
(3.26) [3.67] (2.42) [2.50]
management fee 0.0360 0.4787** 0.1263* 0.0558* 0.4790** 0.1703**
(1.12) [67.02] [2.57] (1.98) [67.04] [4.15]
performance fee 0.0077 -0.0278** 0.0008 0.0049 -0.0278** -0.0038
(1.93) [-37.51] [0.19] (1.30) [-37.47] [-1.01]
min investment -0.0048** -0.0047* -0.0040** -0.0039*
(-4.89) [-2.28] (-3.89) [-2.25]
fund age in months 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0004
(1.75) [1.27] (-0.15) [-0.94]
log (fund size) -0.0202 -0.0154 -0.0057 0.0005
(-1.53) [-1.29] (-0.46) [0.05]
log (inception family size) 0.0656** 0.0658**
[35.76] [35.84]
Table 11
Explaining hedge fund performance, controlling for selection bias
The Heckman (1979) selection model is used to control for selection bias in regressions on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. Two sets of regressions are estimated:
one with monthly return as the dependent variable and another with monthly alpha as the dependent variable. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model. The variable FLOW_POS is fund flow last month when flow is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. The variable FLOW_NEG is fund flow last month when
flow is negative and is equal to zero otherwise. For each set of regressions, the leftmost column reports the regression results before correcting for selection bias. The middle
column reports the results from a probit selection equation, estimated using maximum likelihood, for the probability of a hedge fund offering favorable redemption terms, i.e.,
redemption frequency less than or equal to a month. The rightmost column reports the regression results after correcting for selection bias. The coeffient estimates are estimated
using pooled OLS with year, strategy, and geographical region fixed effects. The t -statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors that are clustered by fund, are in
parentheses. The z -statistics are in brackets. The evaluation period is from January 1997 to December 2008. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Heckman model Heckman model
dependent variable = monthly return dependent variable = monthly alpha
